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 Zeno of Elea, despite being among the most important of the Pre-Socratic 
philosophers, is frequently overlooked by philosophers and scientists alike in modern 
times.  Zeno of Elea’s arguments on have not only been an impetus for the most 
important scientific and mathematical theories in human history, his arguments still serve 
as a basis for modern problems and theoretical speculations.  This is a study of his 
arguments on motion, the purpose they have served in the history of science, and modern 
applications of Zeno of Elea’s arguments on motion. 
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When approaching a paper regarding Zeno’s paradox in such an encompassing 
manner, an explanation of the motives of this work, as well as some preliminary 
comments related to the understanding of this work as a fluid whole, are in order.  There 
are several themes which I wish to convey here, and I am concerned that without the 
proper guidance these themes may not properly manifest themselves on account of the 
eclectic nature of the paper. 
 The first question one will ask after reading this paper is most likely “Do you seek 
to disprove the existence of continuous motion?”  To make such an assumption upon 
digestion of the paper is one most merited.  The answer, however, is frankly no.   
Most of us have faith that we live in a universe in which the force through which things 
progress and change occurs is continuous.  The word I wish to stress here is faith, which 
leads to the first of my themes in this paper.  In a society where the basis for truth 
becomes more reliant upon the evidence and the “thumbs up,” so to speak, from the 
natural sciences – currently biology, geology, and physics in particular – and less on faith 
– religious, optimistic, or otherwise – I seek to provide evidence that even an idea such as 
continuous motion that is part of the very foundation of what man believes to exist, that 
even this is not solidly proven and is but a theory based upon our own perceptions, and 
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thus it is subject to the scrutiny to which any other theory is susceptible.  If through faith 
one accepts the perception of continuous motion at face value, it follows that a sullied 
notion such as faith may be given new relevance and importance in a world which often 
seeks so diligently to discard it, even when science does offer evidence to the contrary.  
My reasoning for the necessity of a call to faith as the basis of continuous motion may be 
understood in my section on Psychology. 
 Indeed, man now has the luxury of science.  Though science has accomplished 
great things and allowed for the progression of society and technology – most likely more 
so than any other contrivance of the human mind – the problem which faces science is the 
fundamental flaw of the scientific method: for two reasons it is ultimately self-defeating.  
The nature of the scientific method, and indeed of any formal, empirical inquiry, is one 
that will never allow a complete account of the universe.  As technology and knowledge 
of the universe become more acute, man discovers that there is even more which he does 
not know, or that he has not discovered, than he had sometimes ever imagined 
previously.  This point is best emphasized in Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy: 
But science, spurred by its powerful illusion, speeds irresistibly toward its 
limits where its optimism, concealed in the essence of logic, suffers shipwreck.  
For the periphery of the circle of science has an infinite number of points; and 
while there is no telling how this circle could ever be surveyed completely, noble 
and gifted men nevertheless reach, e’er half their time and inevitably, such 
boundary points on the periphery from which one gazes into what defies 
illumination.  (p.97-98) 
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We furthermore find that science itself admits in a preliminary disclaimer that it may 
never reach beyond the bounds of material existence; notions such as faith and the soul 
are fundamentally transcendent of science’s inadequate clutches.  Another abstract 
construct which science may not lawfully ponder, though it is often never considered, is 
the infinite.  All scientific investigation must begin with empirical evidence – from some 
experience of the senses.  Because one cannot experience infinity, it is thus an abstract 
construct completely outside the bounds of the material universe or of the natural 
sciences that serve as a methodology for its discovery and understanding.  So then one 
must accept that anything which involves faith, a soul, or the infinite – namely God, 
religion, and faith – is intrinsically something with which science must refuse to deal. 
 One may ask “but doesn’t the science of mathematics deal quite commonly with 
the infinite, with its various formulas and theorems?”  Indeed mathematics does 
commonly dabble in infinity; however, we must be careful as to what we call a science.  
Mathematics is scientific in the sense that its theorems are hypothesized, tested, and 
established.  However, mathematics is fundamentally different from any of the physical 
sciences with which it is associated.  Mathematics is quite unlike biology, chemistry, 
physics, and the like; rather than serving as a study of the physical world, as these are, 
mathematics is a formalization of principles of logic.  These principles of logic, unlike 
elements of the physical world, are not subject to variation or change.  As many have 
heard asserted, two and two have always been equal to four, and will continue to be 
forever.  Mathematics, rather than being a study of physical reality, is the tool that 
represents logical reality, which we use to study reality’s physical manifestations.  This 
view of mathematics borrows heavily from Plato’s view of mathematics in that it takes an 
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ascendancy over the world of “seeming” and is rather a part of the eternal, intelligible 
world.  Though I am skeptical of the Platonic tradition, I am nonetheless confident that 
this is an accurate view of mathematics, and being so it is necessary to make this 
distinction for the reader. 
 Should science seek to prove or disprove such things on its own grounds, an 
informal fallacy occurs – the fallacy of ignorance.  A fallacy of ignorance occurs when 
one concludes that an argument is false because it cannot be proven, or that it is true 
because it cannot be disproved:  it takes only elementary deductions then to understand 
why science is in error any and every time it seeks either to prove or disprove the 
existence of a creator, a personal god, etc. which by science’s very nature it can never 
prove or disprove.  Nonetheless, many armchair scientists with little understanding of 
science’s objections and limits press on in error in attempts to disprove these supernatural 
hypotheses for the paradigms of existence in the name of scientific atheism – an atheism 
that through science alone cannot have any logical foundation. 
 In the spirit of such argumentation, another purpose of this work subsequently 
becomes imminent.  Not only in the present times, but through all time have people been 
subject to the competing views of theologies, philosophies, and innumerable mundane 
arguments.  Though some of these arguments may only be reduced to aesthetic ideals or 
matters of opinion, an equally abundant number of such debates may have clearly defined 
winners, should one appeal to reasonable and logical faculties that are intrinsic within all 
people.  For example, though one may never be able to satisfactorily end the debate 
between science and religion for one side or the other, as the ultimate questions involve 
compelling yet aesthetic requirements of faith, one can decide which arguments for or 
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against are reasonable and logical, and likewise those which are irrational contrivances 
appealing to the perpetuation of either side’s ambitions and ideals rather than appealing 
to reason or solid evidence.   
This work is a micro-study of a series of arguments.  A set of arguments, reasoned 
judgments of whether these arguments are sound or unsound, and the explanations behind 
these judgments are all explored.  I hope that analysis of these arguments may to some 
degree strengthen the logical and reasoning faculties of the reader, that the reader may 
translate such strength into his or her own life when faced with more practical arguments 
in the “common-sense” world.  No person is inhibited by keener powers of reason. 
 These are times when the very things which man has believed to be true and 
existent are to be challenged.  In light of the intrinsic uncertainty
1
 and relativity which the 
currently accepted scientific and philosophical theories provide, nothing stands firmly 
held sacred by the minds of those who seek an integrated theory of our universe.   
Though I have explicitly expressed that I hold faith in the existence of continuous 
motion, at least the common colloquial sense in which we experience it, it is quite 
possible that the arguments and evidence provided here may change the reader’s 
perspective on the nature of the universe.  Indeed, such a goal is not primary, but 
nonetheless I may only hope that I challenge the reader to at least reconsider what he or 
she believes to be real in the general sense, and then after weighing such evidence, reason 
whether or not such considerations are in fact provable or are but mere reliance.  
With the study of argumentation, and the controversies of quantum physics, faith, 
                                                 
1
 The uncertainty to which I refer is in the general sense, that, especially under present conditions, scientists 
are unsure as to the true nature of matter and energy; because of such uncertainty, many opposing theories 
have spawned, each about as possible as the other.  This uncertainty, however, is not to be confused with 
the acceptance of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle.  The ramifications of such a mistake are discussed 
in the heading The Philosophy of Weird Science. 
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and other strange bedfellows aside, one final purpose becomes manifest.  No definitely-
comprehensive account has been afforded to Zeno since Aristotle’s first refutations in the 
Fourth Century B.C.  Yet Zeno has been offered at least a passing fancy in, if not a nod of 
admiration for, his paradoxes and/or Eleatic philosophy by almost every Western 
philosopher of notoriety since Plato.  Kant, for example, in his logic textbook asserts that 
Zeno “distinguished himself as a man of great intellect and acumen and as a subtle 
dialectician (p.32).”  As far as Eleatic philosophy is concerned, not only did it have great 
effect upon the entire Platonic tradition of Western thought (including Augustine, 
Descartes, and a host of others – all of which are discussed in a later section), it also 
served as an inspiration to Leucippus (Russell, 64) and Democritus, the co-fathers of 
atomic theory.  Indeed this very theory was preliminary to the scientific discovery of the 
atom and the atomic theories following from it, which in no small part launched the 
phenomenon of intellectual discovery and rigor that has guided science for centuries.  We 
also find that one of Socrates’ (through Plato) most significant contributions to 
philosophy was his method of dialectic, which Bertrand Russell cites as first being 
implemented by Zeno in his arguments (The History of Western Philosophy, p. 92).  So 
here we find Zeno not only as a thinker esteemed by the overwhelming preponderance of 
the great Western philosophers, but even as the “man behind the curtain” of some of the 
foundational discoveries and theories which have guided Western academia into the 
present.  To understand and argue the thought of such a man is a task most honorable and 
propitious in an age dominated by edicts of science: one which is becoming increasingly 








Man has always placed divisions between his categories of learning.  Presently, 
human knowledge exists on something that may be compared to a continuum, yet with a 
strict division between the poles of this continuum – a divide that is based upon 
Aristotelian principles.  On one side of this continuum are what Aristotle called in his 
Posterior Analytics “scientific knowledge” (Gr. epistêmê) and “art” or craft (Gr. technê).  
Scientific knowledge is gained by coming to understand nature by human experience, 
experience that is resultant of impressions from the environment being accumulated in 
memory.  The formal study of this empirical wisdom is the foundation of natural science.  
Art is the application of the knowledge of a trade or science to some practical skill (which 
may be any skill: pottery, medicine, law, mechanics, etc.).  It is the spirit of scientific 
knowledge and craft that is salient among modern science and formal education in 
general.  Most academic subjects are extensions of epistêmê and technê: history, 
economics, psychology, and the entire host of academia.  Champion and central among 
these sciences, the science which seeks most primarily to understand the nature and 
relationship of the matter and energy that compose the sensible universe, is physics.  On 
the other side of this continuum exists that which lies in the hypothetical, the discussion 
of what is basic to all the experiences of humanity – what Aristotle defined as 
understanding of the first principles (Gr. nous).  This dichotomy of academic subjects 
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into the empirical and the speculative, the practical and the theoretical, the utilitarian and 
the aesthetic has been seen for millennia, being found in the most ancient of Western 
philosophical texts.  Sadly, most of academia has succumbed to the notion that the 
highest goal for human knowledge is to find causation and effect, to understand what 
causes bring about what effects and why, without an integrated understanding of 
knowledge writ large, or of human nature.  Perhaps the last intellectual garrison for nous, 
academic philosophy, presses on diligently in a hope to avert the firestorm of superficial 
knowledge from squelching the importance of nous from higher education entirely. 
Scholars who adhere to one of these two methodologies of knowledge tend to not 
get along with one another intellectually, and those who study solely in one extreme or 
the other tend to exhibit a great deal of intellectual bias.   Indeed, there are those who 
promote the idea that understanding underlying principles is a heady subject for aimless 
philosophers, those whose heads scarcely come down from the clouds to contend with 
what matters, that is, practical application; likewise there are those who find members of 
the previous group lacking vision, feeling that they are shallow and without concern for 
the ultimate knowledge of fundamental principles that may allow the human race insight 
into the great questions of nature and of existence itself.  Such a contention surely sounds 
exaggerated and unrealistically haughty.  One may be compelled to ask oneself “is such a 
seemingly “tribal” type of conflict honestly occurring in universities and academic 
circles?”  The reality, as this author has experienced as a student, is that sadly it does.  
However, one finds that occasionally the lines between these two extremes can 
blur.  Current theories in physics, such as relativity and quantum mechanics, are many 
times no different from philosophy in either appearance or substance.  Throughout the 
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history of thought there have there been those who walk upon these blurry lines, 
simultaneously delving into both the physical and philosophical modes of knowledge.  
The most brilliant of those integrators have contributed significantly to both sides of the 
chasm.  One of those who walked this precarious path was Zeno of Elea, a Greek 
philosopher who lived some two and a half millennia ago.  This lone genius devised a set 
of arguments, of which four will be examined.  These four brilliant arguments, well over 
2,000 years old and devised before the innovation of any modern conceptions of 
mathematics or physics, have continued to provoke questioning even when restated using 
modern physical descriptions of space and time.  This study is comprised of several 
sections, which involve not only the presentation of Zeno’s paradox and its scientific and 
logical solutions but also the various implications across multiple disciplines to which his 
paradox is applicable.  Claims supported by evidence are given to argue against some of 
the most fundamental preconceptions of human existence, but with a forewarning not to 
necessarily accept everything presented as truth.  This is a short expedition through logic 







In order for one to understand that which spawned Zeno’s conception of his 
paradoxes, it would be beneficial to understand the history of the school of thought in 
which he was educated and the philosophy of his teacher and mentor.  If one is able to 
understand the intellectual climate during this time in Greek history, one may have a 
clearer view of the ingredients which were placed into Zeno’s training and the product 
Zeno produced when given these ingredients. 
The line of thought, which eventually led to the Eleatics and Zeno’s arguments, 
began circa 570 BC at the dawn of Greek philosophy.  Among these “fathers” who were 
laying the groundwork for Western philosophy through their contrived cosmologies and 
theologies was Xenophanes of Colophon.  Xenophanes, who was exiled and thus forced 
to become a wandering nomad, is widely considered by Greek scholars to be the most 
eccentric and unconventional of the early philosophical poets
2
.  Concurrently, scholars 
are also in accord that Xenophanes formed the most scientifically inaccurate early view 
of the cosmos.  Even ancient scholars were highly critical of him; Heraclitus described 
Xenophanes as “one of those whom learning had not taught sense” (Boardman, Griffin, 
& Murray, 1998, p. 133).  What quaint propositions could merit such derision from both 
ancient and modern critics?  Xenophanes believed that the earth extended to infinity in all 
                                                 
2
 It is difficult to ascertain that the early pre-Socratics were “philosophers” in the sense that the thinkers 
following Socrates were.  Rather, these men were poets with ideas that inspired the beginnings of academic 
philosophy, and are thusly given merit as the first philosophers. 
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directions, that the sky was infinitely high, and that there were infinitely numerous suns 
so that a different one was seen in the sky each day: indeed quite dissonant with the 
modern scientific consensus.   
What is to be noted here, however, was Xenophanes’ theology, which did attract 
the attention of other ancient thinkers.  Xenophanes is accredited with having been the 
first of the philosophers to make an attempt to devise a methodical account of the nature 
of God (Lesher, 2002).  Xenophanes is also one of the earliest Greek proponents of 
monotheism.  The god of Xenophanes was universal and singular, “formless.”  Not only 
did it have no definite shape or form, it remained eternally static yet effortlessly moved 
the universe by virtue of its immense intellect.  (Boardman, Griffin, & Murray, 1998) 
It may also be noted that Xenophanes could very well be credited as one of the 
earliest contributors to the philosophy of mind, in modern terms “psychology.”  In his 
poetic discourse on the nature of God, he points out that various tribes worship gods who 
look like them, and goes so far as to say, “if cows and horses had hands they would no 
doubt depict their gods as cows and horses” (Boardman, Griffin, & Murray, 1998, p, 
132). Prior to Xenophanes, no one voiced the notion that man arranges his environment – 
whether consisting of gods or otherwise – to best suit his personal/cultural interest.  This 
statement is one still viable in theological arguments about the existence and nature of  
God. 
Despite Xenophanes of Colophon’s nomadic milieu, he eventually settled in Elea, 
where a school based upon his philosophy was founded.  The founder and greatest 
philosopher of this school was Parmenides, who was born around 570 B.C. and was 
active as a philosopher by 539 B.C. (Boardman, Griffin, & Murray, 1998).  Parmenides is 
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considered among the most important of the pre-Socratic philosophers, namely for his 
contributions to logic and scientific theories.  His philosophy provided the framework for 
Plato’s philosophy, particularly the idea of an unchanging reality transcendent of the 
world of seeming.  The great difference between the two, however, is that Plato did not 
reject the notion of plurality as Parmenides did.  Nonetheless, Plato refers to Parmenides 
as a personal “father” (241d) in his dialogue Sophist.  It is clear then to see that one need 
not look with much diligence to discover that Parmenides may be called the grandfather 
of Western Philosophy: for from Parmenides came Plato (and likely Socrates), who 
continued the tradition of the philosophy of being, which states that there are static, 
underlying principles (or for Parmenides an underlying thing, since he does not believe in 
plurality) that transcend the illusionary world of seeming and change.  From Plato came 
Augustine, from Augustine came Descartes, and in light of such a lineage both the 
Catholic religion and rationalistic philosophy owe a great debt to this easily forgotten 
pioneer.  
Parmenides not only developed the school’s doctrine of unchanging oneness 
formally, but he is also accredited as being among the first philosophers to use deductive 
logic in argumentation.  Parmenides’ doctrine of a static world behind the material one 
was evolved by Plato into what became the cornerstone of his philosophy – and the first 
of the two philosophies (along with Aristotle) that have since dominated Western thought 
– the world of the forms.  Furthermore, he continued with Xenophanes’ other significant 
contribution to the evolution of Western thought: that one could not begin to explain or 
understand the nature of that which is within the bounds of sensible human experience – 
only matters of the intelligible may be comprehended.  In the realm of Greek philosophy, 
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no one even dared challenge the tenets of this argument before Aristotle; clearly, 
Aristotle and those of his tradition have to this day been unable to satisfactorily answer 
this argument for all. Because of this Xenophanes and Parmenides are considered to be 
the earliest important contributors to the evolution of the scientific method.  The 
empiricist philosophy, concurrent with the progression of modern science, owes quite a 
debt to them as well in two ways.  Firstly, the early development of this method was of 
the tradition of Francis Bacon, who undoubtedly had it in mind when he pioneered the 
scientific method.  Secondly, it is the Eleatic distrust of the senses that has led to the 
tradition opposing Empiricists, Rationalism.  As Empiricists emerged as a reaction to the 
Rationalist tradition, it is from this distrust of the senses the Empiricists have counter 
arguments to refute while providing evidence for their position.  One of Parmenides’ 
greatest students, our beloved Zeno, clearly had a rather well-constructed platform upon 
which to construct his arguments.   
Parmenides’ severe rejection of any competing philosophy of the time subjected 
him to a great deal of scrutiny from the rest of the philosophical world.  These champions 
of Greek convention used rigorous deductive logic, Parmenides’ own creature, as a 
weapon by which to destroy each tenet of Parmenides’ philosophy.   Zeno, a loyal and 
zealous student, desired to show the Hellenic world just how absurd taking logic to such 
extremes was by using that very tool to prove that the Eleatic philosophy was indeed true, 
and that through logic one might seek to either prove or disprove anything to the point of 
absurdity.  The method of argumentation which Zeno utilized may be found in the section 







 Over the course of Zeno’s life, he constructed forty arguments.  Of those forty, 
only eight have survived through the centuries, escaping destruction by conquest and the 
purging written material in the name of vanquishing heresy.  His four on motion are by 
far the most famous and mulled-over.  Zeno made these four arguments to construct a 
paradox (though this is not the only paradox Zeno constructed, it is synonymous with 
what is commonly referred to as “Zeno’s paradox” in colloquial literature) which would 
logically prove that motion in the universe, in the way the universe was viewed not only 
by the common man but by physicists until around the twentieth century, was logically 
incoherent.  These arguments may be divided into two categories: the first two deal with 
proving that the universe (consisting of space and time) may not be logically infinitely 
divisible, the second two arguing that a finitely divisible universe is also logically 
impossible.  Should one read Aristotle’s Physics or many of the works which have since 
tried to explain Zeno’s arguments, he would discover that not only are they difficult at 
times to follow but sometimes even disagree on exactly what the paradoxes are saying.  
In spite of this lack of a consensus, this work will try to provide a concise yet easy-to-
follow survey of the paradoxes while maintaining strict adherence to the content in their 
earliest preserved appearance in Aristotle’s writing. 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST A CONTINUOUS UNIVERSE 
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The Dichotomy 
Zeno’s first argument is known as the dichotomy, which will be explained by way 
of an analogy involving archery.  Subject A shoots an arrow at a target.  First, it is 
established that it takes some amount of time, which will be defined as T1, to reach 
halfway to the target.  From between half the time to T (T1) and three quarters of the way 
to T it takes an amount of time also, which will be called T2.  Thus far the time traveled 
toward T has been T1+T2, and the arrow is three-quarters of the way to the target.  One 
must also understand that T2 is one half of T1.  If the process of cutting each “T” in half 
and adding that total to the original total is continued, assuming the universe is 
continuous, this may be done ad infinitum.  Zeno argues that taking an infinite number of 
finite amounts of time equals infinity, and though the subject does get closer and closer to 
the target, the subject still never reaches it.  On an even smaller scale, if one wishes to 
travel even the shortest distance possible, this argument still applies the same: one never 
travels even the shortest distance possible, just as the arrow never reaches the target.  
Zeno argues from this that motion can never take place, because one can never actually 
travel any distance.  (Huggett, 2004, Mathpages, 2006, McCartney, 2000) 
The Achilles 
Zeno’s second argument, the Achilles, works very similarly to the Dichotomy.  It 
is described with the illustration of a race between the Greek hero Achilles and a tortoise.  
First, establish that Achilles and the tortoise are moving at different speeds: Achilles at 
one meter per second and the tortoise at 0.1 meters per second.  The tortoise, however, 
has been given a 0.9 meter head start.  Practically one would say that in one second 
Achilles catches up to the tortoise.  However, if one begins to half the distance Achilles 
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must travel in a fashion that is similar to the first argument, one finds that Achilles never 
catches up to the tortoise.  Each time one takes half the distance that Achilles has 
traveled, one must also take half the distance the tortoise has traveled and add to it the 
distance between them; the tortoise has traveled a little farther that Achilles must travel in 
order to reach it.  If one continues this ad infinitum, one finds that Achilles must make an 
infinite number of “catch-ups” to the tortoise, because the tortoise has always traveled a 
little farther each time Achilles makes his catch-up.  Achilles never actually reaches the 
tortoise.  (Huggett, 2004, Rosenstein, 2004) 
 From these two arguments, Zeno thus concludes that the universe may not be 
continuous but rather is necessarily constructed of finite particles, because infinitely 
divisible motion leads to problems such as these.  This is important to note, as the entire 
concept of Zeno’s paradoxes lies in systematically proving the logical impossibility of 
continuous motion in his first two arguments, then proving the logical impossibility of 
discontinuous motion in his second two arguments.  
ARGUMENTS AGAINST A DISCRETE UNIVERSE 
The Arrow 
 Zeno’s third argument is the Arrow.  If one assumes that time exists in a series of 
finitely divisible moments, one may never find a difference between moving and non-
moving objects.  It is established that at no instant is an arrow in motion, because at any 
instant the arrow is occupying an amount of space equal to its size – thus the arrow 
travels no distance.  If time, as it was classically considered, is composed of nothing but a 
series of instants that are of some discrete length, and during none of these moments can 
one find the presence of motion, then the arrow can never move at all because it never 
 21 
moves in any particular instant. 
The Stadium 
Zeno’s fourth argument, the Stadium, is his most controversial.  It is not only the 
resolution of the problem which is undecided, but also what it is that Zeno actually 
intended the argument to mean.  Because of this, various sources have given two 
discrepant problems relating to Zeno’s Stadium argument and corresponding resolutions.  
Between these two interpretations, however, it will be shown that the first interpretation 
has a much stronger case for being accurate in regards to Zeno. 
The first deals with the apparent “jump” in two equal bodies moving in directions 
opposite to a third static body of also equal size.  For simplicity a diagram will be used: 
A¹A²A³Moving Body A 
C¹C²C³ -- “Stadium”     
B¹B²B³Moving Body B 
 
This is the stadium at one instant.  If time and movement occur in discrete units, in this 
case the length it takes one sub-letter of the body to move one letter length, this is what 
the stadium will look like in the next instant should bodies A and B each move one space 
in opposite directions: 
A¹A²A³ 
    C¹C²C³ 
        B¹B²B³ 
Zeno’s problem is that in the first instant A³ is aligned with B³ and C³.  However in the 
next instant A³ is aligned with C² and B¹.  When was A³ aligned with B²?  How did this 
“double-jump” occur?  Zeno argues that because of the time is composed of discrete units 
for this argument they never meet, though logically and in sense experience they do.  
This is the more popular interpretation of the argument, as it is the one presented in 
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Aristotle.  (Aristotle, 239b33-240a16) 
The second interpretation is much simpler and deals with a finite maximum 
velocity.  Zeno says that if motion is discrete at a base level, then it must also be discrete 
as the values of such velocities become greater and greater.  Simply put, if there is a 
smallest particle, a smallest time interval, a smallest measurement, then likewise there 
must also be a largest of each of those corresponding constructs.  Let us assume that there 
is some maximum speed.  If A is looking at two bodies, B and C, approaching each other 
from the left and right, and the two bodies are approaching each other at the maximum 
speed, then they are approaching each other relative to A at twice the maximum speed.  
This clearly leads to a contradiction, and thus there can be no finite maximum speed.  
However, this seems to be more of an application of the first interpretation.  Most likely 
this is merely nothing more than that, and though it is logically sound, one should not 
confuse it with the genuine Zenonian argument that is presented in Aristotle.  
THE PARADOX 
 Now Zeno’s paradox emerges: if motion is logically inconsistent, if motion is 
continuous and infinitely divisible, but it is also logically inconsistent if motion is finitely 
divisible and discrete, there can be no motion because for motion to exist there must be a 
logical paradox!  Indeed this has been food for thought for mathematicians, philosophers, 







First and foremost, Zeno was a philosopher and logician.
3
  It is very easy, 
however, to view him in the fallacious way in which many philosophers and scientists 
alike tend to: to consider him a scientist and use scientific or mathematical theory to 
disprove his arguments (which are rather easy with modern theory) and cast them aside 
for no further consideration.  When one does this, however, one misses the entire idea 
which drove Zeno’s formation of the arguments.  It is beneficial and somewhat necessary 
then that before a scientific exploration of Zeno’s arguments that his philosophy and 
logic be examined – in the area in which he participated – so that Zeno may be 
confronted “on his own turf,” so to speak.  
REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM 
 The style of argumentation which Zeno used in his attempt to disprove the 
existence of motion is indeed a powerful one, formally known as a reductio ad absurdum.  
In formal logic, a reductio ad absurdum is defined as follows: if some statement, 
proposition, premise, etc., which will be called P, is true, then Q is also true.  However, it 
is logically impossible, given P, for Q to be true.  Thus, P is also untrue.  To present a 
formal definition using the mathematical notation, the reduction is as follows: ((p ⊃ q) & 
(p ⊃ ~q)) ⊃ ~p.  Literally interpreted, this means if both p then q and p then not q, then 
                                                 
3
 Though Zeno lived before any formal definitions of logic were formed, one looking back may surely 
accept that had such foundations been set then Zeno would have called himself a logician, and on this basis 
he should be considered one regardless of the legitimacy of his arguments. 
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not p.  As simple a formula as this is ostensibly, it has proved to be an invaluable tool for 
mathematicians and logicians through the centuries.  The first known use of the reductio 
was by Pythagoras in the 500’s BC, when he proved that the diagonals of a square cannot 
be measured with the sides.  By first assuming that perhaps the opposite was true, that the 
diagonals could be measured by the sides, and then showing how such an assumption 
would lead to a logical contradiction, he concluded that his original hypothesis was 
verified.  This is also the first example of one of the mathematician’s greatest weapons, 
the indirect proof.  To see how vital this method of reasoning has been to mathematics, 
one only needs to refer to the copious mathematical theorems that have been verified 
through this method and are thus accepted as true.  One of the most notable examples is 
the famed proof of the irrationality of the square root of two, first published by Euclid in 
his Elements.  It is first assumed that the square root of two may be expressed as the ratio 
of two numbers (the nominal property of a rational number) that, when squared, equal 
two.  However, one must accept that the denominator is both rationally indivisible and 
may also be divided by two, which is clearly contradictory.  Ironically, it was considered 
Pythagoras’s greatest downfall as a mathematician that he refused to accept the existence 
of irrational numbers  He held firmly to the ideal that the universe was governed by 
whole and rational numbers, and to even propose that numbers that could not be 
presented as the ratio of two whole numbers was preposterous and blasphemous; the 
Pythagorean student who first presented to Pythagoras that there are some numbers that 
cannot be so written was put to death by Pythagoras’s order.  Please refer to Appendix I 
for a thorough proof or the irrationality of the square root of two. 
PER IMPOSSIBLE 
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 Sometimes Zeno is given the credit as being the author of reductio reasoning; 
however, as noted above, it is actually Pythagoras who was the true father.  What Zeno 
did utilize first was a method of reductio argumentation known as per impossible 
reasoning.  Though it may be difficult to separate this from the general reductio 
argumentation, per impossible reasoning occurs when one attempts to establish a 
conclusion with premises that are inherently impossible.  If the premises are 
contradictory, then one may imply any conclusion they wish.  This statement may be 
stated symbolically as P · ~P ⊃ Q, where Q represents any statement at all.  Zeno’s 
argument was based upon this style of reasoning: it is impossible for motion to exist, 
because to assume motion exists does means that one may cross an infinite distance in a 
finite time (as he shows by his Dichotomy and Achilles arguments), or that something 
may be both where it is and where it is not simultaneously (as shown by the Arrow). 
ARISTOTLE 
As mentioned previously, Zeno’s arguments were left unchallenged until 
Aristotle.  A question has been ignored but must now be presented: is Zeno logically 
consistent in his arguments?  Is there, if perhaps not a scientific ground, a logical ground 
on which to accept Zeno’s paradox?  It is necessary to turn to the original source from 
which all knowledge of Zeno’s arguments comes: Aristotle’s works. 
Aristotle mentions Zeno in several places throughout the massive body of his 
work, and frequently uses him as an example.  Zeno’s paradoxes are explicitly given in 
Book VI of Aristotle’s Physics.  It is not necessary to relate Aristotle’s explanation of 
Zeno’s arguments here; they are expounded in the previous section.  There are, however, 
some points that are pervasive of Zeno’s four arguments to consider.  Zeno’s Dichotomy 
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and Achilles are based upon the same principle.  Is an infinite distance required to be 
traveled as a result of Zeno’s division?  By using Zeno’s analogy the answer is, in a 
word: no.  What Zeno has committed here is a logical fallacy that has been a danger for at 
least as long as the time of Zeno, and, indeed, is a danger necessarily as old as deductive 
reasoning itself, a fallacy of equivocation.  An equivocation is committed when one shifts 
the meaning of a term in an argument, and thus an unproven conclusion is invalidly 
reached.  What Zeno equivocates is infinite and infinitesimal, two terms that are based on 
the same principle (namely unending measure) but are quite different.  This fallacy may 
be expressed no better than by Aristotle himself: 
Hence Zeno’s argument makes a false assumption in asserting that it is 
impossible for a thing to pass over or severally to come in contact with infinite 
things in a finite time.  For there are two ways in which length and time and 
generally anything continuous are called infinite: they are called so either in 
respect of divisibility or in respect of their extremities.  (233a22-26) 
Think of the fallacy in the following sense: though one may divide a ruler into an 
indefinitely great number of points, such divisions do not make the ruler any longer that it 
was originally.  Apparently, such a discernment of the two terms has been exceedingly 
difficult for many minds throughout Western history.  Aristotle also takes the assumption 
of dividing length into infinite points to make it infinitely long and applies it to time: one 
may take time and divide it infinitely, and in doing so then comes into contact with 
infinity of time.  With infinity of time at one’s disposal, one may then easily traverse an 
infinite distance.  Thus is driven the first of the two nails into Zeno’s logical “coffin.”  
But there are counterarguments to be made in Zeno’s defense, which will be given later.  
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 In regards to Zeno’s Arrow, there are several objections to be considered.  Firstly, 
Aristotle makes a claim far ahead of his era; the Arrow is wrong because Zeno fails to 
account for time.  Aristotle says in Book V of his Physics that “everything that is in 
motion is in motion in time and changes from something to something” (239a23-24).  
The claim implies that no motion occurs outside the consideration of time, and that 
motion must necessarily be measured in regards to time.  An expounding of this may be 
found in section V.  To retain pertinence to Aristotle however, it must suffice for now to 
declare such a relation only in the general sense.  Since motion occurs in time, even to 
attempt to define motion outside the consideration of some time interval is absurd.  
Conversely, the absence of motion, or what would be termed “rest” in the context of the 
Arrow argument (if the arrow isn’t in motion it is at rest), must also be measured over an 
interval of time; one cannot tell if something is at rest when one cannot tell if something 
is in motion.  Take a simple analogy: how can one decide whether or not some person is 
male when one does not know whether or not that person is female?  The presence of 
motion or rest falls upon the same reasoning.  Therefore, when Zeno tries to define 
motion in some discrete, particular “now” (as termed by Aristotle, synonymous with an 
instant) in which there is no period of time to consider, one cannot conclude that an 
object is in motion or at rest; “for at a now it is not possible for anything to be either in 
motion or at rest (239a37-239b1).”  If these aren’t sufficient for the reader, Aristotle also 
attacks the proposition of a universe comprised of indivisible units.  He claims that no 
magnitude may be composed of indivisible units, much less time (Ch. 9).  In his On 
Indivisible Lines, Aristotle discusses the existence of a smallest discrete magnitude, 
beginning by stating the opposing view that one does exist.  Using Zeno’s Dichotomy as 
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the evidence, the proponents of the theory believe that because one cannot encounter an 
infinite number of things in a finite time, there must be some smallest magnitude, or as 
the title of the work suggests an indivisible line, to eventually cross and dispel the 
seemingly resultant logical contradiction.  Aristotle corrects them, stating that in a certain 
sense infinite and finite occur simultaneously because though the number of points are 
infinite, the distance is finite.   
Aristotle makes another brilliant point, millennia ahead of his time, by stating that 
there are also differences in infinity; that though some things are infinite in the sense of 
one by one counting, some things are rather potentially infinite in the sense that one may 
continue adding possibilities so to speak forever, and thus it is impossible to even begin 
“counting” as is possible in the first case.  What makes this reply so ahead of its time is 
that this argument is identical to the foundation of modern day set theory, which is 
discussed in section V.  While in the vein of modern science, what one also finds here is, 
in theory, an ancient argument disputing the existence of supertasks.  The possibility of 
supertasks has emerged only in the last few decades, as a by-product of quantum theory.  
Further explanation of them may be found in section VI. 
 Zeno’s Stadium was seemingly the easiest argument for Aristotle to refute, and 
unlike the other arguments this one is almost unanimously considered logically erroneous 
from the get-go.  What Zeno assumes for some reason is that every sub-letter of the 
bodies in the example in section IV must meet with each subsequent sub-letter at each 
discrete instant.  Zeno fails to notice that making this argument also assumes continuous 
motion, even though for this argument Zeno is assuming that motion is discontinuous and 
discrete.  Therefore the sub-letters of the bodies can logically make the “double-jump” 
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between one discreet instant and the next (Grunbaum, 1967). 
 A few points should also be made on Aristotle’s comments on Zeno’s paradox as 
in general.  Aristotle mentions in his Sophistical Refutations the difference between 
showing a false conclusion and accurately revealing the root of that conclusion:  
There is nothing to prevent the same argument from having a number of flaws; 
but it is not the exposition of any flaw that constitutes a solution; for it is possible 
for a man to prove that a false conclusion has been deduced, but not to prove on 
what it depends (179b17-20) 
What is the implication to modern students of logic?  What Aristotle says, in simpler 
terms, is that Zeno has committed one of the basic fallacies of logic in his arguments (it 
should be noted the very system of Western logic has an Aristotelian foundation), the 
accident.  An accident occurs when the premises of an argument are logically irrelevant 
to the conclusion.  For example, one concludes that because all apples have a core, and 
because apples and oranges are both fruits, oranges must also have a core.  Here the flaw 
in reasoning is clear; the commission of such a fallacy is synonymous with the old cliché 
of “comparing apples to oranges.”  Similarly, what Aristotle means in the aforementioned 
passage is that simply because one demonstrates the logical error of an argument, as in 
Zeno’s case where he shows the contradiction inherent in his arguments, he doesn’t 
necessarily show the reason for the contradiction in the arguments – simply put there is 
no evidence that the contradiction emanates from the nonexistence of motion. 
Aristotle offers final words of warning for those who may be perturbed by these 
arguments.  In On Indivisible Lines Aristotle rebukes those who follow Zeno’s line of 
reasoning because of their inability to logically satisfy a refutation of it: “It is surely 
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absurd that, because you are unable to solve Zeno’s argument, you should make 
yourselves slaves of your inability, and should commit yourselves to still greater errors, 
in the endeavor to support your incompetence” (969b4-6).  He repeats his warning a few 
lines later, writing “Moreover, it would be absurd for people to be led astray by Zeno’s 
arguments and to be persuaded—because they cannot refute it—to invent indivisible 
lines” (969b17-18).  A rebuke as important to note in modern times as it was for 
Aristotle’s contemporaries 
ZENO SURVIVES 
The first attack on Zeno was indeed crippling, and those who follow the 
Aristotelian mode of logic – which is most any sensible person – would surely agree that 
Aristotle retains logical consistency throughout each of his critiques of Zeno’ paradoxes.  
It is indeed difficult to consider the paradox of motion in a spirit of gravity in light of 
Aristotle’s refutations.  However, logical consistency is not alone sufficient to produce a 
powerful argument.  As any novice logician knows, a sound argument requires a set of 
premises having two characteristics: a conclusion that cannot be false if all the premises 
are true and the premises themselves are all true.  As has been made transparent over the 
centuries, by way of science and mathematics, Aristotle failed to deliver in terms of the 
latter characteristic on his arguments.  So, even Aristotle’s massive intellect could not 
snuff out Zeno for all time.  Nonetheless, one wonders why Zeno’s paradox has 
continued to survive in the arena of conjecture despite such crippling blows inflicted 
upon it. 
Two answers are appropriate: the second answer one may conjecture to be likely 
resultant of the first.  The first reason is one based on psychological grounds.  The desire 
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to question is part of human nature; if it weren’t then science and the empirical method 
would have never sprung into being.  To question and wonder is indeed a very 
fundamental part of what makes us human.  One cannot help but be reminded of the 
famous maxim of Socrates recorded in Plato’s Apology; at Socrates trial he exclaimed to 
his accusers that “the unexamined life is not worth living” (Plato, Ap. 38a).  It is not 
overly difficult to grasp as well that the more commonly-held and perceptually 
fundamental a belief is, the more intriguing any doubt, no matter how flawed or 
incomplete it is, against that common notion would be. 
To remain fair to logic, however, those who are skeptical of Aristotle’s critiques 
are afforded some ground.   Aristotle offers solutions to all of Zeno’s arguments, but two 
of these solutions
4
 share a common foundation - one which is shaky enough to have 
allowed a continued faith in the seriousness of the paradox.   
As a general response to the Dichotomy and Achilles arguments, Aristotle claims 
that magnitude and time are dependant upon one another.  If Zeno believes that an 
infinite distance must be crossed to reach any point, then Aristotle claims that time may 
be stretched in the same way as magnitude so that there is an infinite amount of time in 
order to reach the point, making the “infinite” distance needed to travel possible.  For the 
Arrow, Aristotle writes that one does not reach Zeno’s conclusion regarding the 
motionless arrow if one does not begin with his assumption that time is not composed of 
point-like “nows,” but rather discrete units; “if this assumption is not granted, the 
conclusion will not follow” (239b31-32).  One must ask himself, has Aristotle actually 
defeated Zeno’s claims, or has he merely tried to find a tidy way to “patch things up?”  
                                                 
4
 One must keep in mind that the Dichotomy and Achilles are based upon the same argument, and the 
Stadium argument is inherently flawed.  Essentially, only two arguments need to be considered in order to 
critique the paradox. 
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Aristotle himself claims that a mere declaration of the falsehood of a statement is not 
sufficient disproof, but does he subscribe to his own philosophy with these two critiques?  
Aristotle makes an error here in making assumptions which he is not warranted to make.  
To say of the Arrow that if one does not make the assumption the conclusion does not 
follow has no detrimental effect on the argument, it being merely a tautology.  Of course 
if one does not make the assumption then the conclusion will not be reached!  Zeno does 
not argue this, but rather what the consequences of making such an assumption are.  So 
then Aristotle’s only real argument here is that Zeno is wrong because it is certainly true 
that time isn’t composed of discrete instants.  The problem though is that Aristotle 
himself offers no proof!
5
  Whether or not this conclusion seems more reasonable or not is 
of little concern to one who requires reasonable evidence for any claim; with no 
evidence, either empirical or by common sense derivable from pure thought, Aristotle is 
merely pitting his own personal opinions against Zeno’s, and whether or not Aristotle’s 
sounds more reasonable or not is immaterial, at least if one is attempting an internal 
critique of Zeno.  
A similar mistake is made in Aristotle’s “time and magnitude argument.”  
Aristotle’s construction of this argument rests upon assuming that one may not determine 
locomotion or time without the consideration of the other, an assumption which Zeno 
never made.  As far as Zeno was concerned, and as far as Greek mathematics and science 
had discovered, time had nothing to do with locomotion.  Not only is the claim that time 
and magnitude are necessarily dependant on one another completely without foundation, 
at least not at the time of Aristotle’s writing, he once again fails to recognize that Zeno 
                                                 
5
 We might, however, upon study of Aristotle provide some of our own.  For example, time is 
metaphysically conceived in terms of distance (i.e. a line in space).  Just as a line segment isn’t composed 
of points, so time isn’t of instants. (from J. Garrett)  
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makes no such claim himself, and during that time Zeno had every right to not assume 
that motion and time are dependant on one another.  Zeno could also just as easily rewrite 
his argument to say that one must cross an infinite amount of time in order to reach the 
next point, in which case his argument stands unchallenged again (de Sousa). What one 
finds is that in essence Aristotle has claimed that Zeno is wrong because his arguments 
(excluding the Stadium) are logically fallacious under Aristotle’s conception of physics, 
which was largely a compendium of the common sense view of the physical world in 
ancient Greece, a view which science has determined to be, though certainly the most 
well-thought and sophisticated of its time, largely mistaken. 
These are the attacks which have been made upon Aristotle regarding the 
paradox, veiled by skepticism yet with a secret resolve to perpetuate Zeno of Elea as a 
serious figure in philosophy.  Throughout the past 2,300 years these attacks have been 
unanswerable strictly within the scope of philosophy.   There is one argument that has 
been constantly overlooked though - which has been purposely left unmentioned until 
now.  Aristotle also claims, as is mentioned in the previous heading, that there are two 
kinds of infinities: one in relation to division and one in relation to extremities.  This 
argument is unchallengeable because it points out a basic logical fallacy (as noted above 
an equivocation).  This argument may defeat Zeno’s infinitely divisible, continuous 
motion arguments single-handedly, and most likely would have in ancient times had the 
Western world possessed an understanding of infinity as progressive as Aristotle’s.  For 
this reason the argument was overlooked, because it was not until the time of Leibniz and 
Newton that this distinction between infinite and infinitesimal took firm hold in the 
scientific community.   
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If one uses only Aristotle’s refutations as a basis for physics, and commits oneself 
to the presented problems in Aristotle’s refutations, one will be led to logically conclude 
that motion occurs continuously.  This is exactly what Isaac Newton concludes, and in 
the process constructs a physical system in which time and space are absolute, and 
though measurements of one are made in relation to the other mathematically they were 
assumed to exist independently of one another.  This classical mechanics was the next 







 After the consideration of Aristotle, Zeno lay dormant.  Though being mentioned 
in the cumulative accounts of Western philosophy, any consideration of his paradox has 
escaped public record, and to consider the absence of such a thing as motion in physical 
existence would most likely have been tried as heresy under the reign of Roman 
Catholicism.  Rather, philosophy turned its head away from such “outrageous” 
speculation after the fall of the Roman Empire and as both Christianity reigned and the 
source of power spread from Rome to all of Western Europe philosophy began to worry 
itself with new topics - namely arguments for the existence of God and discourses on 
Christian theology.  Indeed, some of the most profound philosophy of the Western world 
came from these Christian philosophers – namely Augustine of Hippo and Thomas 
Aquinas – but never did philosophy enjoy the freedom and governmental support granted 
to it in Ancient Greece and Rome, that is, post-Socratic Ancient Greece and Rome.  
CALCULUS & CLASSICAL MECHANICS 
Though, as far as this author and many others are concerned, Zeno’s paradox was 
exposed as logically fallacious, the first great mathematical breakthrough in proving why 
Zeno was wrong coincided with one of the greatest discoveries of mathematics, the 
Calculus.  As any amateur historian of mathematics knows, the discovery of this branch 
of mathematics is among the most storied of all history, including the romantic imagery 
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of Newton writing his Principia in the cold attic of a cottage during the winter of 1665 
(Beckmann, 1971) and the ensuing debates between Newton and Leibniz as to who was 
the true discoverer of the Calculus; however it is sufficient to strictly cover the pertinent 
mathematical theorems, as enough authors have written such biographies with more 
beautiful literature than is necessary for this study. 
 The first of these mathematical answers to Zeno’s paradox lies within limit 
theory.  Limit theory is the first thing that is taught in an introductory calculus class; the 
whole of calculus rests upon the understanding of limit theory’s simply-stated yet elegant 
basis:  a mathematical function can be made to be as close to some value as desired by 
making the variable in the function sufficiently close to a certain value.  Symbolically 
written, one may say , where x is the variable in the function, c is the 
answer for the function desired, and L is the value of x that brings the output of the 
function as close to c as is mathematically possible.  For examples illustrating the limit 
function, please refer to Appendix II.  Zeno’s first two paradoxes are solved by a specific 
type of limit known as the infinite series.  An infinite series is an infinitely large group of 
numbers that becomes increasingly close to some number, though no number in the series 
ever ever converges upon or becomes equal to that number.  The first infinite series to be 
considered in the Principia was a mathematical representation of Zeno’s paradox, which 
Newton was as well aware of as any of the other scientists and mathematicians of his day.  
The series is a group of numbers beginning with one half, with each subsequent term in 
the series being one half of the previous term added to the sum ad infinitum.  One has a 
series consisting of 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8…1/∞.  Zeno’s incorrect assumption was that the sum 
of this series was infinity.  The conscientious reader may follow that this sum is actually 
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equal to one; however this is only partially right.  Because the series is never ending, the 
sum can never actually achieve unity, or become equal to one.  Rather, this problem is 
better stated “the limit of this series as x (representing the number of terms in this series) 
approaches ∞ is 1.”  With this statement the series may then be made as arbitrarily close 
to one as desired in practical application, but is only truly equal to one when there are an 
infinite number of terms present.  With this example, mathematics proved that an infinite 
series of numbers can actually have a finite sum (in the case of the example above, the 
sum being one), and that Zeno was at least half wrong – the Dichotomy and Achilles 
arguments were based upon faulty reasoning and it could be proven with numbers rather 
than words. 
 As noted in the previous section, during the time of Newton in Europe one who 
was to consider whether the universe was continuous or discontinuous in light of 
Aristotle’s and Zeno’s arguments and the weaknesses thereof would gravitate
6
 toward the 
belief of discrete motion, a universe having absolute space and time.  As Newton based 
his physics upon this proposition, he made a mathematical attempt to answer the last 
remaining argument Zeno presented 2,000 years ago, the Arrow.  One of the elementary 
properties of classical physics is velocity, the rate of change and direction of a body’s 
position over time.  In Newton’s genius, he was able to incorporate the rules of calculus 
to describe physical properties and processes.  The velocity of an object can be calculated 
by taking that body’s position, which can be defined by a mathematical function, and 
finding its derivative, a tool of calculus.  By taking this derivative, which is itself a 
function, one may determine the velocity of that object at any instant.  This type of 
calculation is known as differential calculus (a differential is defined as an infinitesimal 
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change in a value, for the purpose of determining speed that variable is time), which 
along with integral calculus comprise the mathematical field’s two branches.  The speed 
of an object determined by this calculation is known as instantaneous or differential 
speed. 
 By the 1700’s, three major systems in the progression of man’s knowledge of 
physical reality (Aristotelian physics, classical mechanics, and calculus, though the first 
is incompatable with the second two and had by this time mostly been shown mistaken) 
had arisen as the result of three of the West’s greatest scientific minds, and systems 
concurrently made gallant attempts to slay the troubling paradox that was constructed by 
Zeno of Elea.  Though Aristotle’s attempt, which was itself plagued by small 
discrepancies, was not sufficient to quiet those who may advance a theory of nonexistent 
motion, surely this new science and mathematics that could internally answer all known 
physical questions in existence, and prove it with numbers, would deal the killing blow.  
However, once again Zeno’s paradox escaped the clutches of certain perishment, though 
scathed, with enough wiggle room to give doubt to this new physics and mathematics.  
This doubt was nestled in the nature of the limit theorem.  A skeptic of calculus may hold 
a philosophical view that it is an invention born out of man’s own incapacity to deal with 
the infinite.  What does the necessity of the limit theory, when a variable is approaching 
infinity, imply?  Because humans cannot actually solve a problem that requires 
calculations of infinitely long numbers, a method must be devised that approximates such 
values to an arbitrarily accurate degree.    This method of approximation, though able to 
gain accuracy excellent enough to build bridges and gauge the speed of trains, is not 
exact, and anything less than exact is not enough for a logician or philosopher who holds 
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a certain view, especially when one does not wish to discard such a view anyway.  For a 
similar reason, skeptics did not believe that differential speed was exact enough to 
disprove the logic of Zeno’s Arrow argument.  One must consider velocity conceptually 
to respect this skepticism.  Velocity is by definition a change in position over time, or 
dx/dt, where x is the position and t is time.  Instantaneous velocity is not the change in 
velocity when t = 0 as some think, because to make t = 0 would lead to no solution, as 
any ratio with zero as the denominator is taken to “blow up” to infinity.  Rather, 
instantaneous velocity is the ratio of the change in position to time as t approaches zero, a 
limit.  Just as one cannot obtain an exact answer with infinitely long numbers, so one 
cannot obtain an exact answer for an infinitesimal interval of time, t = 0, and is thusly 
required to approximate. 
 The question of the validity of these approximations was not solely made by 
proponents of Zeno’s paradox; rather, this question was trifling compared to the more 
practical ramifications of these approximations.  Though the approximations of infinitely 
long numbers are adequate when dealing with small-scale questions, such as those in 
engineering and “real-world” applications, what happens when the need for 
approximations of numbers closer to infinitude in both the macro and micro sense occur, 
say when determining astronomical problems such as planetary motion or the movement 
of particles within an atom?  The answer is that calculus simply cannot account for 
motion on grand and minute scales, and the discovery of the physical and mathematical 
truths that do is the big story in science from the 1700’s to the present. 
SET THEORY 
 The next advance in cracking Zeno’s logic with mathematics came in the 1870’s.  
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The end of the Nineteenth Century was a pivotal time in the history of science.  
Experiments and discoveries that questioned the validity of the most basic of physical 
and mathematical truths were being published by some of the most brilliant minds in 
human history; it was these minds that sparked the doubt and zeal for innovation in the 
scientific youths of this age that would lead to the discoveries that have caused an 
upheaval of the whole domain of scientific understanding.  Before such understandings 
could manifest, however, mathematics that could accurately describe such theories would 
be required.  One of these early mathematical discoveries was part of what has become 
set theory, a widely-studied branch of number theory.  Number theory is the study of the 
relationships between numbers: what is called “pure mathematics” because it is the study 
of numbers as entities in and of themselves and not merely as symbols for practical 
application.  Number theory deals with the same questions regarding infinity that were 
raised first by Zeno of Elea in his paradox 
 In 1874, the German mathematician Georg Cantor published one of the seminal 
papers of modern mathematics “On a property of the set of real algebraic numbers,” a 
paper from which the foundations of modern set theory emerged.  Set theory is a branch 
of number theory that describes the nature of collections of objects without mass or 
energy (that is to say, abstract mathematical objects), and the relationships between these 
objects or elements (the technical name for the objects that comprise a set).  Set theory 
has had vast implications for the modern understanding of infinity, and the relationships 
between infinite sets of objects. 
 Set theory is best introduced by explaining it in terms of finite sets.  A finite set is, 
as common sense would imply, a set that has a finite number of elements.  A set with no 
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elements, called the empty set, is also classified as a finite set and denoted by the Greek 
letter Φ (phi).  Set theory is not particularly interested in lone sets, however, but rather 
the relationships between sets.  For example, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} is a finite set with five 
elements.  Likewise, {boy, apple, carrot, car, tree} is a finite set with five elements.  Both 
of these sets share cardinality, which is defined as the characteristic which a set shares 
with any equivalent set.  For any set with a finite number of elements, the cardinal is 
simply the number of elements.  The two sets in the above example share a cardinal of 
five.  When considering infinite set, it is deceptively simple to say that all infinite sets are 
infinite, since they all have an infinite number of elements, and therefore share a cardinal 
of infinity.  Fundamental to set theory, however, is the principle that not all things that 
are infinite are equally thus, therefore some things are “more” infinite than others. 
 Infinite sets are considered to be equivalent if each element of the set could 
theoretically be put in a one-to-one ratio with one another.  For example, it is a basic 
axiom of mathematics that there is an infinite number of both odd integers, denoted by 
the letter O, and prime numbers, denoted by the letter P (though this set’s infinitude is 
debated more than the former’s).  However, it can be shown that they are equal because if 
one were to write out the entire list of each set, each element of one set would be paired 
up with an element of the other set.  For these two sets, the first positive odd integer, 1, 
can be paired with the first prime number, 2.  The next odd integer, 3, can be paired with 
the next prime number, which is also 3.  These pairs between the elements of these two 
sets are unique, and this pair method may be continued ad infinitum, theoretically. 
 Common sense would assert that among these numbers, the set of rational 
numbers would be greater than the sets of odd and even integers, primes, and rational 
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numbers, since all of these sets are arithmetic subsets of rational numbers.  In other 
words, all of the sets mentioned above are included in the set of rational numbers, but not 
every rational number – in fact most rational numbers – is a part of one of these other 
sets.   
Yet before jumping to this conclusion based upon common sense, it is necessary 
to look at what Cantor says about equivalence, expressed in Cantor’s Theorem.  Each set 
may be divided into a certain number of subsets, consisting of each element and any 
combination of each element.  The number of these combinations is called the power of 
the set.  For the set {1}, this power set consists of {Φ, {1}}.  For the set {2, 3, 5 }, the 
power set is {Φ, {2}, {3}, {5}, {2, 3}, {2, 5}, {3, 5}, {2, 3, 5}}.  From these two 
examples, one may draw a general formula for the power of a set.  The power of a finite 
set is equal to 2
n
, where n is equal to the number of elements in a set.  The powers of the 
two example sets are 4 and 8, respectively.
 
 From this formula Cantor’s Theorem is 
drawn: the power set of any set S is larger than S.  Though this is easy to see for finite 
sets, it requires some abstraction for an infinite set.  Any two infinite sets are equal if they 
share cardinality, if each element of the sets may be paired in a one-to-one ration.  So, 
looking at the set of rational numbers and the other infinite sets that are seemingly 
smaller than it, one finds that actually they are all equal! 
From Cantor’s Theorem it would seem to hold that any infinite set is the same.  
However, upon examination one may find that this is not the case.  The set of real 
numbers is in fact larger than any of the other categorical sets (integers, primes, rational 
numbers, etc.).  This is so because the elements of the set of real numbers cannot be 
placed in an ordered pair with the elements of any of the other sets.  In fact, should one 
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take on the task of counting the real numbers, one would be quite daunted in even trying 
to begin – the first element of the set of real numbers would have an infinite number of 
decimals.  For this reason one cannot even count between one real number and the next, 
save the ones that have a finite number of digits such as the elements of the smaller sets 
mentioned above, which constitute only a relatively infinitesimal portion of the entire set 
of real numbers. 
Though the sets of integers, rational numbers, and company are countably infinite, 
the set of real numbers is uncountably infinite.  In this comes the error that led to the 
formation of the Dichotomy and Achilles arguments: a division of length that is 
uncountably infinite, such as the division Zeno makes when he separates the distance into 
halves ad infinitum, is equivalent to infinite length.  Yet, all that these arguments say in 
answer to the logic of Set Theory is that the number of possible divisions within any 
interval, such as between 0 and 1, is uncountably infinite.  Nonetheless, the interval itself 
remains finite, and so the arrow hits the target and Achilles overtakes the tortoise, 
because these arguments lie in Zeno’s confusion of countable and uncountable infinities. 
RELATIVITY, MINKOWSKIAN SPACE, HEISENBURG UNCERTAINTY 
PRINCIPLE 
The story and theory of relativity, special and general, is much too deep and 
convoluted to recount without the addition of a book-length study.  Thus, it must suffice 
to resort to brevity for the purpose of advancing this study toward the applied material.  
Einstein, Minkowski, and Heisenberg all stand as giants in the realm of physics, however, 
and to discredit them as mere workhorses for the purpose of this paper is quite 
pretentious.  It is highly suggested that one engage in study of each of these brilliant 
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pioneers, as they stand in the same Hall of Greats as Newton, Leibniz, and Cantor. 
Until the implementation of general relativity, there was no satisfactory solution 
to the Arrow argument.  The classical image of space and time, which Zeno clearly 
argued against, assumed that time is composed of a series of instants.  In relativity, 
however, space and time are not independent, and the basic way in which space and time 
fit together corresponds with Zeno’s argument.  In the briefest way of putting it, objects 
in relative motion do not exist on the same plane of simultaneity, and thus not only do 
objects in motion appear different to nonmoving objects (the world), but the nonmoving 
objects also appear different to the moving perceiver.  (Mathpages, 2006)   
In light of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, the evidence is further solidified.  
This principle states that one may not precisely know both the position and movement of 
a moving object simultaneously.  Position and movement are now two constructs which 
are all but undeniably incompatible with one another in terms of simultaneous 
measurement.  Thus, the classical “sum of instants” model which existed until the 
twentieth century has been shown as a theory that is invalid for understanding motion on 
“any and every” scale.   
Also, modern non-quantum physics uses a universe in its calculations known as 
Minkowskian (named after its discoverer, Hermann Minkowski) space, which consists of 
four dimensions—three space and one time.  This division of space into four dimensions, 
which is usually shown graphically in two dimensions of space and time, highlights the 
dependence of space and time upon one another.  Some modern problems and theories 
associated with this problem are introduced under the Motion and Time heading of 
Section VI.  For the second interpretation of Zeno’s Stadium argument, Minkowski also 
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offered the concept of G∞, which essentially explains that there may be no upper limit on 
velocity (Mathpages, 2006).  Here one also has an alternative to the idea of a limited 
maximum velocity, an answer stating rather bluntly that there is none.   
In 1927, amid the debate between relativity, which had only come into existence 
in 1905 with the publication of Einstein’s legendary paper on special relativity, and the 
startling discoveries that would lay the framework for quantum theory came a discovery 
that would rock the foundations of the world.  This discovery was made by Werner 
Heisenberg, and the concept which was the fruit of this discovery now bears his name: 
the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. 
This principle states, in the terms most accessible for non-physicists, that the 
position and momentum of any object, from a quark to a planet, may not be both known 
precisely at any instant.  As the accuracy of one of these measures is increased, it is a 
mathematical conclusion that the accuracy of the other measurement will decrease.  
Interestingly, this principle is partially supported because it has incidental ties to a 
physical value: the product of the two measures of uncertainty (∆x∆p) equals a number 
that is some multiple of Plank’s constant, a number which manifests itself in a number of 
equations across several scientific disciplines. 
Theoretically, this principle implies that the world as seen by classical physicists 
is wrong.  It was a common belief that one could not only know both the exact position 
and momentum of a particle at any instant, but that one could then determine the future of 
that particle for an arbitrarily extended time, on to infinity.  This principle states that just 
the opposite holds, that the position and momentum of any object may only be known to 
a certain degree at any instant, and so its fate is partially up to what appears to us as 
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chance.  This also implies an even stronger relation of motion and time: because one 
cannot measure the position and momentum of an object at any single instant it is 
necessary to measure on an interval. 
A single, succinct paper which explains how physics has traded precision for 
continuity in its measurements of a body’s position, and thus has resolved all of Zeno’s 
paradoxes, save the Stadium argument, was written by Peter Lynds (2002).  A review of 








 Although it is a sad reality for those who wish to overturn apparently unshakable 
ideas, mathematical and physical systems have been incorporated which may satisfy even 
the most skeptical freethinker, assuming he or she submits his or her decisions to the 
most reasonable evidence available.  This is notwithstanding the commitment of oneself 
to a principle in the philosophy of science that is in acquiescence with a common 
standard in Empirical philosophy: that one should tentatively accept as truth that which 
has the greatest probability of being right, given the available evidence.  So the question 
which follows is: what use does Zeno’s paradox serve in a world torn between principles 
of relativity, quantum physics, and other theories, all hoping for an all-inclusive synthesis 
between them? 
 Even if the paradoxes serve no practical purpose for modern academia, they have 
served a phenomenal role in the history of human thought.  The reality of this is manifest 
throughout this work, as it is hopefully clear to the reader that these paradoxes have 
called for the greatest thinkers of Western civilization to ponder them for the purpose, if 
nothing else, of solving them for personal satisfaction.  As a product of this desire to 
solve them, the most crucial of scientific and mathematical theories have come into 
being.  Though it is exaggerated to say that these paradigms of science are direct results 
of thinkers attempting to provide answers to Zeno, the fact that Zeno has been mentioned 
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or discussed by every one of these “fathers” of science and mathematics makes clear that 
his paradoxes at least glimmered in the minds of Aristotle, Newton, Leibniz, Cantor, 
Einstein, and company.   
An even greater contribution has been the dialectic.  Though the dialectic has 
been more commonly attributed as an invention of Socrates (as the dialectic is also 
named the “Socratic Method”), Aristotle and philosophers succeeding him have rightly 
attributed the dialectic to an innovation of Zeno of Elea, though this fact continues to 
elude the knowledge of the layman.   For this reason alone Zeno of Elea deserves a spot 
in the pantheon of intellectual greats.  Yet, beyond this his paradox continues to fuel 
theoretical innovations across the spectrum of science and mathematics (and philosophy), 
and two answers for why his paradox matters are offered to the vehement skeptic. 
As a more superficial, though independently satisfactory, answer the paradox 
strengthens human understanding of the history of thought, and serves as a tool by which 
to strengthen one’s faculties of reason, as was initially stated in this work.  Though 
another explanation of this benefit is unnecessary, it may be profitable to examine some 
of the more lighthearted work done by way of contemporary philosopher/mathematicians.  
These individuals have taken Zeno’s original arguments and modified them slightly so 
that the original errors within the arguments are eradicated.  Though these “puzzles” have 
not led to any breakthroughs in human understanding of the universe or any deep 
mathematical truths, at least not as of yet, they are presently considered unsolved.  The 
reader may take great enjoyment in contemplating these puzzles for his or herself, as the 
most illustrious of which are outlined in Appendix III. 
 Yet, more importantly, the paradoxes do serve vital roles in more than one 
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academic field.  They are not merely intellectual fodder to mull over for leisure, but 
rather are foundational or preliminary of very radical views of the universe and humanity.  
It is self-evident that motion and change exist.  Yet in light of the discoveries of the past 
century, perhaps it is time to revive the Eleatic vision, and question the perception of 
continuous motion.  It is doubtful that most people have ever questioned the nature of 
motion, but rather accept that what appears to the senses is reflective of reality.  This 
notion is known to philosophers as naïve realism, and the rather unflattering name 
reflects the lack of intellectual rigor involved in holding this view.  Even the colossus of 
philosophy Aristotle held a view similar (though not equivalent) to this, referred to as 
metaphysical/epistemological realism, which holds that the senses are capable of leading 
the conscious being to a true understanding of reality.   
Zeno and the other Eleatics, however, were acutely cognizant of the inadequacy 
of the senses.  This awareness is illustrated in Simplicus’ account of Zeno’s millet seed 
paradox, which though should not be confused with the four central to this study is 
nonetheless wonderful in making this point.  Zeno asks Protagoras if a millet seed, or one 
ten-thousandth of a seed, makes a sound when if falls.  When Protagoras answers that it 
doesn’t, Zeno then asks if a bushel of millet seeds makes a sound when it falls.  As would 
be expected, Protagoras answers that it does, and Zeno makes his point from Protagoras’ 
answers.  If a bushel of seeds makes a sound, then some ratio of that, such as a single 
seed or one ten-thousandth of a seed, likewise must make a sound as well – yet humans 
cannot detect it.  Zeno makes it clear that the senses are capable of fooling us, and are not 
to be trusted as the “perfect receptors of form” that many people were led by Aristotelian, 
and other, passages to believe.  (Barnes, 1996) 
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Perhaps after reading the evidence provided, and studying these topics more 
deeply, the illusion that the reader reasonably knows how the universe operates is likely 
to be shaken, and the reader may scratch his or her head with the same confusion that 
modern scientists now imply in their research papers and books.  So the challenge to the 
reader is this: read on and prepare to shake the “common sense” conceptions of motion, 
in the process opening up a door to a truer understanding of reality, compliments of 
derivative Eleatic philosophy. 
PHILOSOPHY 
The Philosophy of Weird Science 
 The tool which allows application of this most peculiar set of ancient arguments 
in “ultramodern” scientific theory is a bridge unlike any other ever constructed by man, 
the science of quantum mechanics.  Before exploration of quantum theory (which may be 
found under the next heading) and what reasonable evidence it may provide, it is 
imperative that science be separated from science fiction, and good sense from the pull of 
mysticism.   
Quantum mechanics is one of the most powerful tools given to the scientific 
mind.  This is not a minority viewpoint among physicists.  For example, E. H. Walker 
says of quantum mechanics, “It is safe to say now that nothing that we see in this world 
lies outside the breadth and scope of quantum mechanics…it describes everything in our 
world.  It seems to have all the answers” (Walker, 2000, p. 68).  The discoveries which 
are derived from quantum theory may easily topple all that has been previously held as 
true concerning the nature of man, the universe, and the particles and energy of which 
they are both comprised.  However, the old cliché is in order: with great power comes 
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great responsibility.  It is unfortunately too simple to take a shred of the truth from 
observational evidence and distort it into one of the innumerable “new age” theories 
which have popped up in the past thirty years.  All these theories seem to have the same 
foundation: take a tenet of quantum theory, such as the Bell experiments, the Heisenberg 
Uncertainty Principle, or wave-particle duality, or some part of special relativity, and 
begin to build a cathedral of faulty logic that allows for time travel, astral projections, and 
any other pseudo-supernatural phenomena which one may wish to insert.  Jamie Whyte 
attacks such shysters of physics in his book Crimes against Logic (2005).  In his section 
entitled “Weird Science,” Whyte first takes aim at those who seek to promote their own 
outlandish claims, and then use the argument of scientific uncertainty to support their 
own claim.  Clearly such an argument commits the fallacy of an irrelevant conclusion, 
whereby the premises are logically irrelevant to the conclusion.  Whether or not science 
is good or bad, right or wrong, has no outcome on the validity of the claim being made.  
Whyte then turns his eyes upon quantum physics, saying that “not everyone who enjoys 
dabbling in conjecture wants to appear anti-science.  For them there is always quantum 
physics” (Whyte, 2005, p. 40).  He specifically calls into question the book in which the 
author states that because physics has now been forced to submit to the Uncertainty 
Principle, that science holds no truths and that there is no distinction between natural and 
supernatural phenomena.  One must be careful; such statements are not only highly 
dangerous but are easily believable without proper physical knowledge.  The author, 
Whyte comments disparagingly, not only fails to properly consider the scope of the 
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle (which only pertains to simultaneously determining the 
position and movement of particles), but also begins to make claims about the merging of 
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natural and supernatural and the complete destruction of science with no evidence 
directly relevant to such a claim.  What one must be then is not only a good student of 
physics, but also one who adheres to scrupulous reasoning when presented with any 
claim, outrageous or otherwise.  When considering a scientific claim, in particular 
theoretical physics, an individual must ask his or herself “How far does this claim stray 
from the observational evidence?”  It is all too easy to take such shreds of truth from 
observational evidence and then begin to dabble into conjecture, as is seen in Whyte’s 
example.  Though each step in such an argument may follow logically, and the 
conclusion may seem to be correct, being logical must not be mistaken for being true: a 
mistake that is too commonly made.  For example, one might claim that every hospital in 
the United States has begun electronically tagging newborn babies with a microscopic 
GPS tracker.  Because of this the government now will be able to determine the exact 
location of any American anywhere in the world within a couple of generations.  If they 
know where Americans are, they can determine numerous pieces of incriminating 
evidence; say, perhaps, the government may know if American youth under the legal 
drinking age are sneaking into bars by such tracking, and then may contact the police, 
who in turn hold stings at such bars that allow minors to enter.  Granted, each of these 
premises may follow logically from the previous; however, the problem is that none of 
this is true!  Though perhaps such faulty evidence is easy to see in this context, in science 
many books are written that utilize this same type of bogus evidence to support foolish 
propositions, and in doing so dupe masses of readers and fellow scientists alike into 
accepting and discussing claims which contain no validity.  With this in mind, then, may 
the reader beware! 
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Free Will 
A most novel philosophical topic concerning Zeno’s paradox is that of free will.  
One such article, which has included Zeno’s paradox as analogous to the question of free 
will (Mole, 2004), reasons that Zeno failed to realize finite and infinite are not mutually 
exclusive ideas.  His Achilles argument failed to recognize that an infinite series can 
converge on a finite number, as has been shown previously.  Seeing that because both the 
finite and infinite can coexist logically in this way, why may the lives of humankind not 
be both products of human will and the outcomes of uncaused causes simultaneously?  
Mole believes that though this may be counter intuitive to the way many think, the way 
these two ideas interact is just as logical as the way finite and infinite values interact in 
the Achilles argument.  The mention of it here is purposely brief, however, and though no 
discussion of the argument’s merit will be given it is encouraged that the readers find the 
original source and consider it for his/herself. 
PHYSICS 
Quantum Zeno Effect 
Most prominently, Zeno’s paradox has found application in quantum mechanics.  
Quantum mechanics, as any physicist knows, is built upon finding the probabilities of 
possible observations at an instant in time, or a sequence of observations at different 
instants.  What mathematical limit would one find should one seek to use an infinite 
number of measurements from continuous observation?  George Sudarshan and 
Baidyanaith Misra first experimented on this question in 1977, and found a rather 
startling answer.  Since, numerous quantum physicists also have researched this question 
and found what Sudarshan and Misra found: that continuous observation would cause no 
 54 
state change to occur, a problem known as the quantum Zeno paradox. Basically, this 
paradox shows mathematically that the probability of observing a quantum system in its 
initial state at any instant during continuous observation is one.  What that means in 
practical terms is that math shows that no motion ever occurs in a system when it is 
observed constantly, which is how sentient beings seem to observe.  Of course the non-
existence of motion was a part of Zeno’s philosophy.  Others such as A. P. Balachandran 
and S. M. Roy (2002) have researched this question and concluded that constant 
observation mathematically ensures that change takes place in a system.  What these 
findings suggest is that both answers are in fact logically consistent; the discrepancy lies 
in the setup of the experiment.  In the experiments commonly done to search for the Zeno 
effect, there are two variables which are measured.  The first variable, E, is made as a 
time-independent variable in the Schrödinger equation (which is used to determine the 
probability).  The second variable, Es(t), is one which is time-dependant.  One arrives at 
the Zeno paradox when looking to measure the variable E.  Conversely, one arrives at 
what is now called the anti-Zeno paradox when looking to measure Es(t).  Measuring the 
same probability for this variable with the same parameters as those used for the quantum 
Zeno paradox finds that the probably that a change will occurs is one, exactly opposite of 
the quantum Zeno paradox.  It seems evident that this conclusion could only provide an 
even stronger piece of evidence for the necessity to measure space and time concurrently: 
that the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle is mathematically and quantum-physically 
vindicated in light of the quantum Zeno paradox.  
Sojourn Time 
Zeno’s paradox has also been found to appear in sojourn time, a topic in quantum 
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mechanics which deals with the length of time a quantum system deals in a particular 
state.  An example of one such paper dealing with sojourn time is one written by W. 
Jaworski (1989).   Here Jaworski examines a system which is observed to decay in a 
certain quantum state, the one in which it exists for the observation.  However, he 
mathematically concludes that should one constantly observe this system, then 
mathematically it would be found never to decay, thus supporting Zeno’s proposal of a 
static universe. 
Supertasks 
The topic of supertasks also appears to exhibit paradoxical tendencies in place of 
Zeno’s arguments.  A supertask is a task which “requires an infinite number of operations 
to be completed in a finite amount of time” (Bokulich, 2003).  Zeno is the first to be 
credited with considering the concept of a supertask with his Dichotomy argument, at 
least in theory.  The paradox holds true in Zeno’s classical argument, which assumes that 
it is impossible to complete the infinite series of tasks, and thus motion is impossible, as 
well as for the quantum variation of the argument, which assumes that completing the 
infinite series is possible, and thus motion is impossible.  (Bokulich, 2003) 
Topology 
It is a bit shortsighted to pass off the work of Benardete and Prosser mentioned in 
Appendix III as mere puzzles.  These puzzles are products of topology, the study of 
physical and mathematical surfaces.  Topology is one of the most rapidly-increasing 
areas of mathematics in terms of interest and study.  The most practical applications of 
this study involve technology.  Though the technology possible is at present mere science 
fiction, Prosser (2006) highlights how some of the principles of infinity in surface study 
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can lead to frictionless surfaces.  These surfaces could be utilized for roads and safety 
features in automotives, and even items as mundane as frying pans, as the article’s title 
hints. 
Motion and Time 
To even consider such business is subject to opening a Pandora’s Box of 
conjecture and speculation.  An entire library of books on the physics of time travel is in 
print for the reader who wants to understand why time travel is possible, theoretically.    
As the relativistic view of physics dictates, time is a conception codependent upon 
motion.  This principle is central to all modern debates regarding time, including: 
dilation, measurement, and even travel.  It has become almost universally accepted that as 
motion exists, likewise does time progress.  It follows logically that should motion cease, 
or be nonexistent, than either time stops or doesn’t exist – else the relativistic 
understanding of the universe be wrong. 
Yet, the relationship of motion and time was not introduced by Einstein as a by-
product of relativity.  The interdependence of time and motion may date back to as far as 
Aristotle, who wrote that “time does not exist without change” (218b21), and who 
concluded that time was something that, though not a type of motion as was a common 
view of the time, dependant upon motion.  This view was cast aside by classical 
physicists, who sought to take off the Aristotelian robes that had prevented new discovery 
in the natural philosophies, the sciences, for over a thousand years.  They viewed time 
and motion as absolutes that were independent of one another, and thought that the 
systems they had developed were sufficient to measure one quantity or the other with 
perfect accuracy, and better yet without the involvement of the other variable. 
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This illusion was shattered, however, after the discovery of relativity and the 
theories that have followed.  The question of whether energy moves in quanta or 
continuously, or whether all outcomes are chance, formulaic outcomes, or by divine 
hands, is up for grabs.  Yet the only consensus among these theories is that time and 
motion are necessarily dependent on one another: as time progresses, so must motion 
occur.  If all motion ceases, then time stops, at least hypothetically. 
 The relationship of motion and time is pondered rather exhaustively by Adolf 
Grunbaum in Modern Science and Zeno’s Paradoxes (1967).  This book is the most 
comprehensive synthesis of scientific and mathematical theory with the philosophy of 
Zeno’s paradoxes to date.  Unfortunately, Grunbaum’s book is now forty years removed 
from the forefront of scientific advancement, and was published long before the first 
research on Quantum Zeno effect, or any of the radical theories that are the progeny of 
advancements (that is to say, hypotheses) in quantum physics.  A modernized tribute to 
Grunbaum’s work is in due order, and will hopefully manifest itself sooner than later.        
Among the most notable of these “radical theorists” is Julian Barbour, a highly 
respected physicist who in 1999 published The End of Time: the Next Revolution in 
Physics.  In this highly provocative and widely acclaimed book he posits that the universe 
is timeless and static – certainly akin to doctrine of illusionary motion, which has been 
established to be a fundamental principle of Parmenides’ school.  Barbour explains how 
all sentient beings merely “travel” through a plane of forms in the most Platonic sense, a 
plane which he in fact calls “Platonia.”  By traveling, Barbour means merely to advance 
from one “frame” to the next, in a manner best illustrated by the still pictures of a film 
reel.  The physics of how this reel moves composes approximately three-quarters of his 
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book. 
Barbour also mentions Zeno’s arguments, particularly the Dichotomy (though 
Barbour mistakenly refers to it as the Arrow).  Barbour explains that the arrow does in 
fact never hit the target, not because it would take an infinite amount of time (by Zeno’s 
logic), but because the arrow shot from the bow and the one which hits the target are not 
the same arrow.  (Barbour, 38-49) 
PSYCHOLOGY 
 In a practical society, one which seeks to unravel the mysteries of the universe, 
surely man must also search to understand the universe on a more personal level – the 
understanding of his own consciousness and existence and the biological mechanisms 
which drive them.  Here is where psychology, the fledgling science, has arisen, so that 
humankind may proceed via the scientific method in the understanding of itself in the 
same way it searches to understand the cosmos.  How does an archaic Greek philosopher 
fit in the equation of understanding a man’s own mind?  In reality, perceptual 
psychology’s and physics’ discoveries about the mechanisms through which people 
perceive the world are very akin to the teachings of Zeno’s Eleatic school. 
If the argument is to be made that the common sense idea of continuous motion 
cannot be proven by scientific evidence, and in fact science has found evidence that 
doesn’t support continuous motion, rigorous examination of the human nervous system, 
especially the brain and eyes, must be undertaken.  The connections that will be referred 
to may be found within the very workings of the human brain through the support of 
neurological evidence.  The commission for making this argument is simple: each 
mechanism of the pertinent psychological apparatuses must be examined for 
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characteristics that open the door for one to claim that the universe is not perceived 
biologically as it is colloquially.    
The Eye & Optic Nerve 
When asking about the mechanisms which drive human perception of motion, one 
must first look into the eye – where the visual information of the universe enters the 
observer.  How fast can the eye perceive information?  This is an area in which research 
is almost nonexistent.  Why in such a heavily studied world is there a lack of research in 
such a seminally important area?  Perhaps to understand the reason, first a summary of 
how the eye functions is in order.  Light enters the eye through the retina, where light-
detecting cells known as rods (for night-vision) and cones (for color vision) are 
stimulated.  This stimulation is caused by a light-sensitive chemical in the rods and cones 
known as rhodopsin.  Light causes the rhodopsin to change its molecular shape, which in 
turn causes the electrical charge in the rods and cones to change slightly- from -70mv to -
40mv.  This electrical charge then allows the information processed by the retina to travel 
along the optic nerve to the Lateral Geniculate Nucleus (LGN) of the brain, and then to 
the primary visual cortex where the information goes to numerous other areas of the 
brain.  Because rhodopsin is readily available and the rods and cones are constantly 
producing an electrical signal, it is assumed that either the eyes perfectly detect (and to 
say perfect in this case is to refer to healthy eyes perceiving visual information at the rate 
and clarity with which it truly exists in the universe) visual information, or at least detect 
visual information at an incredibly high rate that does not merit concern for its limitation.   
Though visual perception researchers do not apparently find this information 
particularly important, it is seminal in the argument which is being made.  A well-
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supported claim may be made that human visual detection is not as “perfect” as many 
would assume it to be.  The human eye contains a finite number of sense receptors: 
approximately 8 million cones and 120 million rods.  In Evan Harris Walker’s The 
Physics of Consciousness (2000), while discussing his theory on the bit rate at which the 
brain may present conscious data, which he named the “conscious channel capacity,” 
some rather revealing information regarding the optic nerves’ capabilities becomes 
apparent.  The two optic nerves, which send information from the eyes to the brain, 
contain approximately one million nerve fibers each.  These nerves transmit information 
to the brain by groups of pulses.  The rate at which these pulses may travel peaks at 
approximately 1000 pulses per second: when a nerve fiber becomes completely saturated.  
Walker argues that this is not a practical value, however, because the optic nerves would 
be unable to sustain a level of activity that high for an extended period.  He approximates 
the value of the pulse rate to be 200 pulses per second on average.  These 200 pulses 
consist of 15-20 ten-pulse groups.  Each of these ten pulses contains about 3.3 bits of 
information.  Total, approximately 100 to 130 million bits of information may be sent 
from the eyes to the brain each second.  In the previous section Walker discusses the 
“conscious field capacity,” the amount of information which one observes in an 
instantaneous moment, i.e. the amount of information one could possibly perceive in a 
static image in a single instant.  Walker hypothesizes the three-dimensional visual field to 
be approximately two million bits of information.  Should one divide the capacity of the 
optic nerves to send information per second, 100-130 million bits, and the amount of 
information which may be perceived in a single instant, two million bits, one obtains a 
divisor between 50 and 65.  What does this mean?  With the ability of the brain aside, our 
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eyes and optic nerves may only send between 50 and 65 static images to the brain in one 
second before saturating the optic nerves.  Since humans are incapable of detecting all the 
details of the events which they believe happen in the universe, how then can a person be 
so sure that he or she is sensing continuous motion at all?  This point will become much 
more compelling after discussion of the brain and the phenomenon of apparent motion. 
The Hopping Quantum Universe 
Consider the actual fluidity of the universe.  Scientists currently use quantum 
physics to describe the universe on an atomic level.  As discussed earlier, scientists find 
that the state of a system, i.e. the universe, is merely a series of probabilities until it is 
actually observed.  Furthermore, they find that atoms move in packets of energy each 
known as a quantum (hence the name “quantum physics”).  This pattern of movement is 
clear when one views atomic movements under a tunneling electron microscope. A 
person does not see electrons which move fluidly through space, but rather disappear in 
one instant and reappear in the next, giving the impression of “jumping” from one point 
in space to the next.  If these elemental entities, from which the entire universe is 
comprised, move in a fundamentally discontinuous manner, how then can one argue for 
the perfect continuity of motion, when no continuous motion is seen on even the most 
elementary level? 
Looking Into the Past 
Should the benefit of the doubt be given to the general assumption regarding the 
performance of visual apparatuses, and it is assumed that human eyes have no inhibitions 
so far as to the time between which a stimulus is presented and the eye actually senses it, 
there must still be a finite limit on how close to the present the eye may receive 
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information from the environment.  This is because of two determining pieces of 
evidence: the measurable length of time it takes visual information to transit across the 
brain and the knowledge that light travels at a finite speed.  Dealing with the former, the 
average neural pulse takes approximately 1/8 of a second to travel from the sense 
receptor to the critical area of the brain (Walker, 2000).  So when someone sees a car 
whiz by him, he may not actually perceive it as directly in front of him until it has already 
passed by him/her.  So far as the speed of light is concerned, it is an amazingly fast speed 
– 300,000 kilometers per second – yet it is a finite speed nonetheless.  What this means is 
that should motion occur continuously, reflections at the speed of light are presented from 
the body undergoing the motion to the eye.  Given this finite light-speed, one must 
conclude that it takes an amount of time for light to bounce from the body undergoing 
what is perceived as motion to the eye.  What people merely view then are events which 
occurred a short time ago; humans view into the past.  How far into the past humans are 
viewing is determined by the distance between the eye and the body being viewed 
(moving or not) divided by the speed of light, plus approximately 1/8 of a second. 
This reality becomes more apparent when one gazes into the night sky.  Many 
have heard the cliché that looking at the stars is “like looking into the past.”  This 
statement is true because of light speed’s finite nature.  When one sees a star that is 100 
light years away, he/she is actually viewing that star when it was 100 years younger 
because of the length of time which it has taken the light to travel to Earth.  Stars that are 
millions of light years away may have already burnt out and died, but man will continue 
to see them in the night sky until generation after generation has come and gone.  There 
are those who argue that only the present exists and that the past is only a memory and 
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the future is an illusion.  But with this information, just the opposite is true.  Not only 
does the past exist, but it is all that humans actually experience, and while seeing the past, 
the future is already occurring and is waiting to be perceived.  Thus, only the past and 
future exist, and they exist simultaneously in relativity to the sentient observer. 
Man’s Sluggish Brain 
Regardless of the eyes’ potential capabilities and the nature of the speed of light, 
there is specific evidence that the human brain does not consciously perceive all 
information that the eyes send to it.  This has been tested by numerous visual researchers 
using experiments in which a spot of light is flashed very quickly at a subject’s eyes, and 
then the length of time in which the light is presented is adjusted, so that the absolute 
threshold at which the mind can consciously perceive the light stimulus can be 
determined.  The general consensus which has been reached is that a stimulus must be 
presented for approximately 100 milliseconds before one may consciously perceive it.  
Despite the impressive powers of the eye, it is quite possible that our brains cannot detect 
on a conscious level perfectly fluid motion, but rather only a series of still images at 
approximately 100 milliseconds between each one. 
Gestalt Theory & Apparent Motion 
How then may people perceive a seemingly continuous motion if that is not what 
the human brain actually interprets from the eyes?  Humans are able to perceive this fluid 
motion because of a psychological phenomenon known as apparent motion.  This 
phenomenon was first studied in 1912 by Max Wertheimer.  He discovered that a series 
of still pictures, when shown to a subject in rapid succession, could give the illusion of 
continuous motion.  At what threshold did he find that humans begin to perceive 
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continuous motion from still-frames shown in rapid succession? The answer is around 
15-20 frames per second (Walker, 2000).  From these findings Wertheimer became the 
father of the psychological revolution known as Gestalt Theory: the basis of this theory 
being that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts; that is, people may perceive a 
sum of static images as not a mere slideshow but rather a moving scene. This is also the 
same concept upon which film and television function.  Film shows project a series of 
static pictures at 24 frames per second (just above the conscious threshold of apparent 
continuous motion given above) at the eyes, and the United States’ NTSC television 
signals refresh on American television screens at a rate of 30 frames per second.  Those 
who view these broadcasts perceive these pictures as the actors, 
anchormen/anchorwomen, and sports heroes of the big and little screen.   
Another question then arises: if motion is merely a contrivance of the human 
brain, then may humans suffer brain damage which inhibits only the experience of 
motion?  The answer is yes.  There is a documented disorder which impairs the 
experience of motion – clinically defined as motion agnosia.  This disorder results from 
damage to the medial temporal (MT) area of the brain: the area which was 
aforementioned to be responsible for our perception of motion.  The effect of this 
disorder is straightforward – a loss of movement perception in all of the three directions 
(or the three perceived dimensions of space).  Patients suffering from this disorder have 
been documented as having symptoms such as inabilities to pour coffee because it 
appears frozen and follow dialogue because facial features can not be seen.  Furthermore, 
when with other people in a room, the other people seem to “jump” from place to place, 
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being at one location in one instant and somewhere else in the next.  (Zihl et al., 1983, 
1991) 
Summary 
The point to be made here is a philosophical one.  Ask the layperson why motion 
exists, and he/she will not recall the results of some famous physics experiment, or begin 
down a line of complex reasoning.  Rather, he/she will simply say “I believe it exists 
because I can move right now – I experience it.”  This is far and away the most common 
argument; after all, if science has taught civilization nothing else, it has instructed 
individuals to make the most reasonable conclusion based on observational evidence.  
The connection is simple: I experience motion both in myself and from the environment; 
therefore, motion must exist.  The previous evidence then is a direct attack upon this 
notion for several reasons.  Firstly, in light of quantum physics humans do not observe 
the universe as moving continuously on the atomic level.  Secondly, the human eye is not 
only limited in the detail it is capable of sensing, but is also limited in the ability by 
which it may see the present in the universe, if not by possible inhibitions in the eye’s 
biological mechanisms, then at least by the finite nature of the speed of light.  From there 
the optic nerve is characteristically inhibited by its limited capacity to send information, 
as well as the delay it suffers in changing its electrical potential with each pulse.  Humans 
also have minds that do not perceive all the information which is presented to the eye and 
sensed, whatever amount that is, as well as minds which are capable of taking still images 
and perceiving them as continuous motion when the images are presented quickly 
enough.  The conclusion which must be reached from this information may be posed in 
the form of a question: how can a person honestly conclude the existence of a 
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continuously moving universe, when not only have scientists not observed one on a basic 
physical level, but given the imperfections of the eye and brain, no person can never truly 
say that he/she’s experienced one either?  Zeno’s school of thought taught that motion 
was merely an illusion of human perception; it is strongly evident that continuous motion 
may indeed be nothing more.  The motion which man concludes so confidently is quite 
possibly merely a belief.  Not through science but through faith does motion occur 
continuously – the same faith which is exercised when men take for granted having the 
breath of life the following day, the same faith men exhibit when they proclaim the 
existence of their gods. 
THE GREAT CONTROVERSY 
The value and validity of Zeno’s paradox have been argued over, despite these 
applications to his problem.  It is simple to kick Zeno to the curb and say that his 
problems have been solved so physicists may work on harmonizing relativity and 
quantum mechanics (or something of the sort).  Individuals such as Andrew Krywaniuk 
feel that not only is Zeno’s paradox not valid, but he is not a particular fan of Zeno’s 
philosophical tradition as is evident in his article “The Failure of Philosophy” (1997).  It 
does not take much imagination for one to assume that there are many who share such a 
similar view, and such an assumption is correct.  It is very easy, sometimes to a fault, to 
accept a pragmatic philosophy.  After all, what practical good does dabbling in strange 
metaphysical concepts do for humankind?  It is clear humans experience motion in their 
everyday lives.  Why then should one be concerned whether or not it scrupulously 
follows all scientific findings?  Such an argument is not only trying to take an easy way 
out, but is completely anathema to the primary objective of science – to discover truths 
 67 
about physical reality.  With this said, there are also many who still argue that not only is 
Zenonian logic and physics applicable today, but those who even say that Zeno’s 
paradox, in its original text, is correct.  One example of a published paper dealing with 
this is “The Tortoise Is Faster,” by Constantin Antonopoulos (2003).    A firm supporter 
of Zeno’s genius and the value of his arguments is Bertrand Russell, one of the most 
prolific philosophers and mathematicians of the twentieth century.  In his book Our 
Knowledge of the External World, Russell goes as far as to say: “Zeno’s arguments, in 
some form, have afforded grounds for almost all the theories of space and time and 
infinity which have been constructed from his day to our own” (Russell, 1926, p. 183).  
There are certainly others who share comparable views.  It is difficult to find much 








 With all of the argumentation surrounding Zeno’s paradoxes, perhaps it would be 
clarifying to look to the source itself for enlightenment as to why Zeno constructed these 
arguments: Zeno’s original writings.   Unfortunately, a rather hindering road block stands 
in the way of accomplishing such a task – Zeno’s writings have never been discovered.  
The only record of Zeno available is primarily through an indirect account of Aristotle, 
and supporting considerations from Plato, Simplicus, and Proclus.  However, one may 
deduce a handful of rather feasible theories regarding Zeno’s motives.   
The first is that Zeno genuinely wanted to disprove motion.  As it has been 
established, a fundamental idea of the Eleatic school of thought was that motion was 
merely a human perception, and that the universe is static.  It is also known that 
Parmenides was a founding father of what Aristotle eventually formalized as logic.  
Given these two facts, it would seem logical that Zeno would put these pieces together so 
to speak in order to create logical arguments to support his teacher’s beliefs, which were 
highly controversial even in ancient Greece.   
The second theory is that Zeno merely meant these arguments in jest.  The 
arguments were published without prior consent from Zeno
7
, and it may not have been 
                                                 
7
  At least one must assume so, since there is no known surviving copy of any of Zeno’s work.  The first 
known thinker to give consideration to Zeno’s Paradoxes, Aristotle, lived in a time period too far removed 
from the time of Zeno of Elea to have even known him, much less ask permission to exhibit his arguments 
in his Physics. 
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Zeno’s intention for these arguments to ever see the light of day.  It was fashionable 
during this time to use logical argumentation, which Parmenides used, to refute the very 
ideas Parmenides taught.  Thus, Zeno, wanting once again to defend his teacher, created 
his arguments to serve as a satire of those arguments being placed before Parmenides.  It 
would certainly fly in the face of Eleatic detractors if Zeno could say, “Look, I’ve used 
the same method you use to attack us to show that motion isn’t even possible!  What say 
you now?”  Regardless of what Zeno’s motives were though, his arguments did survive, 
and they have been a thorn in the side of, or a stimulus to thought for, those who seek to 
ponder logically for 2,500 years. 
A third possibility is that Zeno’s original intention for the paradoxes was the 
purpose that they have served for science: as tools by which to create more consistent 
models of reality.  It is often by revealing what is wrong with a theory that it may be 
made more reasonable, more perfect.  As Eric Engle points out, “paradoxes exist to point 
out flaws in our reasoning” (p.1).  Zeno may have been aware that the common-sense 
notion of physics during his time was not accurate, and by constructing his paradoxes he 
could challenge future generations of thinkers with more accumulated knowledge of 
nature to answer his arguments, and in turn make human understanding of physical 
reality more comprehensive.  Grunbaum makes this speculation about Zeno’s paradoxes 
of extension when he states that “Zeno challenged geometry and chronometry to devise 
rules for adding lengths and durations which would allow an extended interval to consist 
of unextended elements” (1967, p. 3).  Though this calls for a certain degree of faith in 
Zeno’s farsightedness, the testament to Zeno’s intellectual acumen has been made evident 







Much has been argued about Zeno and his little arguments.  They have seemingly 
been refuted and proven by numerous individuals on mathematical and philosophical 
grounds ever since circa 500 B.C.  Even with our modern relativity, Minkowskian space, 
and infinite-series convergence, academia as a whole still cannot come to a final 
consensus over the validity of this paradox.  However, perhaps closure is not necessary.  
As a professor commented to me, “most interesting philosophical questions don’t 
converge on unanimity.  They’re not like inquiry into the boiling point of fluids.”  We 
find that, upon inspection, few questions in philosophy ever reach the convergence that 
would be satisfying to us as thinkers, or even as human beings.   
Regardless of the validity, however, the fruits have been apparent.  Many 
innovative ideas in physics and philosophy (as well as psychology, mathematics and 
numerous other subjects) have come from the pondering of Zeno’s arguments.  These 
arguments have also led to a great refining of logical argumentation and scientific rigor 
throughout the millennia.  For these reasons alone, we should conclude that Zeno’s 
paradox has been highly important to both physics and philosophy, being a theme 
common among many topics in both fields.  Whether the paradox is right or wrong hasn’t 
really seemed to matter.   
The question with which the reader, as well as the author, is faced is a question of 
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validity.  Though Jonathan Barnes tells us that “Zeno now stands as the most celebrated 
of Pre-Socratic thinkers,” (1996, p. 231) to what degree are these arguments beyond the 
novelty of studying archaic philosophy?  Is this consideration of Zeno’s paradoxes one 
deserving of further study, or are they and the theories used in support of this paper mere 
foolishness?  Why do those who either now do or continue steadfast in their belief of this 
paradox’s validity believe?  We must question whether this is a belief founded in reason 
and the furthest progression of good science, or but a wish for the existence of “scientific 
mysticism,” so to speak  As Ronald de Sousa writes of Zeno’s Paradoxes: “Their lasting 
appeal comes from the fact that they appear to give us reason to question something” (de 
Sousa).  What the reader may now be struggling with, as this author has continued to 
struggle with since the beginning, is whether or not this paradox lives on as a means of 
psychological satisfaction in that we are given an opportunity to question something 
fundamental about the world.  Can it be so simple an answer?  Whether we are delving 
into science or astrology, however, is an answer which must ultimately be made by the 
reader.  Perhaps the reader is disgruntled by such a conclusion; shall I end on clichéd 
statements of postmodernism: that the only reality and truth is that in the mind of the 
individual?  Is the primary constituent of truth the same which Grunbaum and others 
claim is of becoming, and that which a myriad of people since the first Ionian 
philosophers have argued is the basis of ethics: the evolved mind?   Unfortunately, I find 
that I am compelled to.  The reader may find some consolation from science, however.  
Let us consult quantum physics; if the theoretics of quantum physics are accurate (as this 
author and many others certainly hope), then such a reality is indeed the only reality 
which exists - the reality which each conscious being creates in his/her mind.  In this 
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spirit, as long as we may justify our beliefs with reason let us believe what we may: for 
the building blocks of the universe are not matter and energy but our own disembodied 
psyches. 
Finally, let us not forget what is perhaps most brilliant of all about Zeno and his 
paradox.  A philosopher who lived 2,500 years ago showed that the classical concepts of 
space and time and the way in which they fit together do not logically work, and by virtue 
of this he in some fashion anticipated principal theories of science and mathematics far 
ahead of his time.  It has taken a plethora of geniuses two and a half millennia to produce 
the scientific and mathematical theories to sufficiently answer Zeno’s questions - these 
theories being the most compelling and profound of their respective ages and disciplines.  
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Proof for the irrationality of the square root of 2 
 
1. For the square root of 2, defined as R, to be a rational number, it must be the divisor 
of 2 numbers in lowest terms, defined as p and q.  If this assumption leads to a 
contradiction, then it is necessarily true that this assumption is false (that the square 
root of 2 is rational). 
 
2. The above statement may be written as R = p/q. 
 
3. The equation in (2) may be squared, so that R2 = p2/q2. 
 
4. Since R is the square root of 2, R2 = 2, which may replace R2 in the equation. 
 
5. Hence 2 = p2/q2, or p2 = 2q2. 
 
6. It follows then that p must be an even number, because it has a factor of 2. 
 
7. So 2x = p, where x is some integer with value n2. 
 
8. So if p is replaced by 2x in the equation in (5), 2q2 = (2x)2, or 2q2 = 4x2. 
 
9. Divide both sides by 2, and one gets 2x2 = q2.  So q is even since it has a factor of 2. 
 
10. If q and p are both even (because they both have a factor of 2), the fraction is not in 
lowest terms. 
 
11. Since this contradicts the original assumption, the assumption that such a rational   



































Modern Puzzles Based upon Zeno’s Arguments 
 
Many minds since Zeno have created paradoxes of their own for thinkers to mull 
over.  Some of the most famous paradoxes in modern times have been the puzzles 
constructed by Jose Benardete, in his book Infinity: An Essay in Metaphysics (1964).  The 
most notable of these puzzles are noted below.   
• “The Paradox of the Gods” (Laraudogoitia, 2000).  The basic concept of the 
argument is that a series of “gods” place walls in front of a man’s way, doing so 
in decreasing intervals along his path (1/2 of the way, 1/4 of the way, 1/8 of the 
way, etc.).  If this continues to infinity, even though there is never a wall put up 
by the “gods” the man is still never able to move; the man can never move 
because of the wall that will be placed in front of him, but because he never 
moves a wall is never placed in front of him.  Priest (1999), Laraudogoitia (2000), 
Yablo (2000), and others have all made their own observations on this paradox, 
arriving at different conclusions and offering alternatives and augmentations. 
• “The Book Paradox.”  Benardete describes a book, with each page being half the 
width of the previous page.  So, the first page has a thickness of one unit, the 
second page ½ unit, the third ¼ unit, and so on.  Assuming that there is no bottom 
limit on the possible thickness of the pages, the book may have an infinite number 
of pages, though its width will be no greater than two units (by virtue of the 
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convergence of the infinite series in calculus).  The study of such theoretical 
objects is involved when discussing the mathematical principles of topologically 
open and closed surfaces, that is, surfaces that either have “no outermost layer of 
points” (Prosser, 2006, p.188) or have an outermost layer of points.  Simon 
Prosser (2006) expands on the theoretical questions surrounding such a book in 
his article The Eleatic Non-Stick Frying Pan.  He asks a series of questions about 
the topologically open surface of the book such as: could a piece of tape could 
stick to the surface, what would happen to a ball should it be dropped on the 
surface, and could a suction cup be applied to the surface to lift the book.  He 
answers all of these questions with deductive reasoning beginning with the 
physical properties of the forces involved in such actions, and with the 
accompanying mathematics.  
 
Mathpages (2006) has taken Zeno’s Dichotomy and reworded his analogy to 
make the argument applicable again.  Though the theories discussed previously, 
particularly limit theory, provide compelling evidence that Zeno’s infinite series 
converges into a finite distance, the argument may be slightly altered to address another 
paradox, one which involves the convergence of a geometric rather than infinite series.  
They ask, what if a photon bounces off a series of mirrors in an ever-decreasing spiral, a 
“Zeno’s maze?”  Though the spiral does have a finite size, bounded by the outer bounds 
of the spiral (and because of this the photon must leave the spiral), one cannot tell in 
which direction the photon will travel out of the spiral because there is no final mirror for 
the photon to bounce off, and the photon never escapes.  A convergence of an infinite 
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series into a finite number is not a satisfactory explanation for this puzzle, as the maze is 
already assumed to be finite in size, given that it has a known perimeter.  The only 
seemingly logical answer to this resulting paradox, given the present knowledge of 
physics and mathematics, is that the universe must be composed of a smallest indivisible 
particle so that there is a last mirror, one which is composed of the alleged single 
indivisible particle.   
